

OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY: THE STICKY-PRICE CASE

APRIL 12, 2010

Introduction

RELEVANT MARKET STRUCTURE(S)?

- ❑ Real business cycle (RBC)/neoclassical theory
 - ❑ All (goods) prices are determined in perfect competition
 - ❑ In both consumption-leisure and consumption-savings dimensions
 - ❑ **Critical assumption: no firm is a price *setter* → no firm has any market power**
- ❑ New Keynesian theory
 - ❑ Starting point: firms ***do*** wield (at least some) market power
 - ❑ **Critical assumption: firms *do* set their (nominal) prices**
 - ❑ Purposeful setting/re-setting of (nominal) prices may entail costs of some sort
 - ❑ "Menu costs," but soon interpret more broadly
 - ❑ Central issue in macro: how do "costs of adjusting prices" ("sticky prices") affect monetary policy insights and recommendations?
- ❑ Upcoming analysis
 - ❑ Step 1: Develop theory in which firms are purposeful price ***setters***, not price ***takers***
 - ❑ Step 2: Superimpose on the theory some "costs" of setting/re-setting nominal prices
 - TODAY →** ❑ Step 3: Study optimal monetary policy

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BASICS OF OPTIMAL POLICY ANALYSIS

- ❑ Describe the **demand-side environment** (i.e., consumers)
 - ❑ Arguments of utility function?
 - ❑ Which assets trade in private-sector financial markets?
 - ❑ Derive consumer optimality conditions
- ❑ Describe the **supply-side environment** (i.e., firms)
 - ❑ Which inputs are used in production process?
 - ❑ Derive firm profit-maximizing conditions
 - ❑ So far: simple factor price = marginal product conditions (i.e., wage = mpn, etc.)
 - ❑ Soon: New Keynesian firm analysis more involved (price-setting decisions)
- ❑ Describe actions/role of **government**
 - ❑ How is monetary policy conducted? How is fiscal policy conducted?
 - ❑ How do government policy choices affect private sector behavior?
- ❑ Describe **resource constraint**
- ❑ Describe **private-sector equilibrium**
 - ❑ For **given** policy choices by government, how does market equilibrium arise?
 - ❑ How does price adjustment/setting affect market clearing?
- ❑ **Optimal policy analysis best thought of as picking a government policy that induces the "best" private-sector equilibrium**

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"CASHLESS" NK FRAMEWORK: CONSUMERS

- ❑ **Basic NK tenet**
 - ❑ Money demand issues (i.e., medium-of-exchange role of money) **not** very important in modern developed economies
 - ❑ **"Cashless" analysis**
- ❑ **Implications for formal NK analysis – monetary policy...**
 - ❑ ...does not operate on/through demand-side of economy (consumers)
 - ❑ **...operates on/through supply-side of economy (firms)**
- ❑ **Recent events: monetary policy operates on/through financial sector of economy?**
 - ❑ Intermediation between demand-side and supply-side...more research coming...
- ❑ **Representative consumer**
 - ❑ Period- t utility function $u(c, 1-n)$
 - ❑ Subjective discount factor β
 - ❑ Period- t budget constraint identical to CIA or MIU model, except no money balances

$$P_t c_t + P_t^b B_t + S_t a_t = P_t w_t n_t + B_{t-1} + (S_t + D_t) a_{t-1}$$

...and so on for period $t+1$, $t+2$, etc.

 - ❑ **No MIU component or CIA constraint**

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"CASHLESS" NK FRAMEWORK: CONSUMERS

□ Lagrangian

λ is multiplier on budget constraint

$$u(c_t, 1 - n_t) + \beta u(c_{t+1}, 1 - n_{t+1}) + \beta^2 u(c_{t+2}, 1 - n_{t+2}) + \dots$$

$$+ \lambda_t [P_t w_t n_t + B_{t-1} + (S_t + D_t) a_{t-1} - P_t c_t - P_t^b B_t - S_t a_t]$$

$$+ \beta \lambda_{t+1} [P_{t+1} w_{t+1} n_{t+1} + B_t + (S_{t+1} + D_{t+1}) a_t - P_{t+1} c_{t+1} - P_{t+1}^b B_{t+1} - S_{t+1} a_{t+1}]$$

$$+ \dots$$

□ FOCs

c_t :

n_t :

B_t :

a_t :

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"CASHLESS" NK FRAMEWORK: CONSUMERS

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$$+ \beta \lambda_{t+1} [P_{t+1} w_{t+1} n_{t+1} + B_t + (S_{t+1} + D_{t+1}) a_t - P_{t+1} c_{t+1} - P_{t+1}^b B_{t+1} - S_{t+1} a_{t+1}]$$

$$+ \dots$$

□ FOCs

c_t :

n_t :

B_t :

a_t :

□ Combine into "MRS = price ratio" type of optimality condition

Consumption-leisure
optimality condition

$$\frac{u_2(c_t, 1 - n_t)}{u_1(c_t, 1 - n_t)} = w_t$$

Unlike CIA analysis, nominal interest rate does NOT
appear in consumption-leisure margin.

Cashless: nominal i.r. is not what causes distortions...

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"CASHLESS" NK FRAMEWORK: CONSUMERS

□ Lagrangian

A is multiplier on budget constraint

$$u(c_t, 1 - n_t) + \beta u(c_{t+1}, 1 - n_{t+1}) + \beta^2 u(c_{t+2}, 1 - n_{t+2}) + \dots$$

$$+ \lambda_t [P_t w_t n_t + B_{t-1} + (S_t + D_t) a_{t-1} - P_t c_t - P_t^b B_t - S_t a_t]$$

$$+ \beta \lambda_{t+1} [P_{t+1} w_{t+1} n_{t+1} + B_t + (S_{t+1} + D_{t+1}) a_t - P_{t+1} c_{t+1} - P_{t+1}^b B_{t+1} - S_{t+1} a_{t+1}]$$

+....

□ FOCs

c_t :

n_t :

B_t :

a_t :

KEY CONCEPTUAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN NK ANALYSIS AND CIA ANALYSIS:

Instead, nom i.r. shows up only in consumption-savings optimality condition

□ Combine into "MRS = price ratio" type of optimality condition

Consumption-leisure optimality condition

$$\frac{u_2(c_t, 1 - n_t)}{u_1(c_t, 1 - n_t)} = w_t$$

AND

$$\frac{u_1(c_t, 1 - n_t)}{\beta u_1(c_{t+1}, 1 - n_{t+1})} = (1 + i_t) \frac{P_t}{P_{t+1}}$$

Consumption-savings optimality condition (from bond first-order condition)

RETAIL FIRMS

□ Representative retail firm's profit-maximization problem

$$\max_{\{y_{jt}\}_{j=0, \dots, \infty}} P_t \left[\int_0^1 y_{jt}^{1/\varepsilon} di \right]^\varepsilon - \int_0^1 P_{jt} y_{jt} di$$

Chooses profit-maximizing quantity of input of each wholesale good. Focus analysis on any arbitrary wholesale good – call it y_{jt}

□ FOC with respect to y_{jt} (for any j)

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□ ...after several rearrangements

$$y_{jt} = \left(\frac{P_{jt}}{P_t} \right)^{\frac{\varepsilon}{1-\varepsilon}} y_t$$

DEMAND FUNCTION FOR GOOD j

□ IDENTICAL TO BASIC (FLEXIBLE-PRICE) DIXIT-STIGLITZ FRAMEWORK!

WHOLESALE FIRMS

- Representative wholesale firm's profit-maximization problem

$$\max_{P_j} P_j y_j - P_j m c_j y_j - \frac{\psi}{2} \left(\frac{P_j}{P_{j-1}} - 1 \right)^2 P_j + \frac{\beta}{1 + \pi_{t+1}} \left[P_{j+1} y_{j+1} - P_{j+1} m c_{j+1} y_{j+1} - \frac{\psi}{2} \left(\frac{P_{j+1}}{P_j} - 1 \right)^2 P_{j+1} \right]$$

Substitute in demand function for wholesale good j in both period t and $t+1$ (and $t+2, t+3, t+4, \dots$)

In period t , firm chooses P_{jt}
So FOC with respect to P_{jt}

Symmetric equilibrium

$$\frac{1}{1 - \varepsilon} [1 - \varepsilon m c_t] y_t - \psi \pi_t (1 + \pi_t) + \beta \psi \pi_{t+1} (1 + \pi_{t+1}) = 0 \quad \text{New Keynesian Phillips Curve}$$

WHOLESALE FIRMS

- So far haven't considered (explicitly) the **inputs** to a wholesale firm's production process

- Very simple model of production

- Production technology in every period (for any wholesale firm j)

$$y_{jt} = f(n_{jt}) = n_{jt}$$

- Can think of Cobb-Douglas with capital share = 0

- Labor hired by wholesale firm j taking market wage w_t as given

- Recall: CRS production technology \rightarrow marginal cost of production is independent of quantity produced

"CASHLESS" NK FRAMEWORK: GOVERNMENT

- ❑ Money is a physical object in the "background"
 - ❑ DOES exist...
 - ❑ ...so there IS a budget constraint for it
 - ❑ But not of direct importance for (routine) monetary policy issues
 - ❑ (Hence doesn't appear in consumers' budget constraints....where does it go?..)

- ❑ Central bank's budget constraint – in every period t ,

$$M_t = (1 + g_t)M_{t-1} \Leftrightarrow \tau_t = g_t M_{t-1}$$
 - ❑ g_t the growth rate of money supply in period t

- ❑ Money-supply rule technically isomorphic to interest rate rule

- ❑ But interest rates explicitly the "policy tool" in New Keynesian analysis
- ❑ i.e., to **implement** an inflation target, what is the nominal interest rate the central bank should set?
 - ❑ Instead of focusing on what is the money growth rate the central bank should set?

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$$M_t = (1 + g_t)M_{t-1} \Leftrightarrow \tau_t = g_t M_{t-1}$$
 - ❑ g_t the growth rate of money supply in period t

NONETHELESS: $g = \pi$ in long run (i.e., steady state)

- ❑ Money-supply rule technically isomorphic to interest rate rule

- ❑ But interest rates explicitly the "policy tool" in New Keynesian analysis
- ❑ i.e., to **implement** an inflation target, what is the nominal interest rate the central bank should set?
 - ❑ Instead of focusing on what is the money growth rate the central bank should set?

Even NK theory views basic monetarist quantity-theoretic link between money growth and inflation as being correct in the long run

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"CASHLESS" NK FRAMEWORK

- Resource constraint – in every period t ,

$$c_t + \frac{\psi}{2}(\pi_t)^2 = n_t (= f(n_t))$$

- Total output used for private-sector consumption...
 - ...and menu costs
 - Recall: menu costs are a REAL cost – hence absorb some of the economy's resources

"CASHLESS" NK FRAMEWORK

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- Summarize private-sector equilibrium conditions

- | | | | | |
|---------------------------|---|--|---|------------------------------------|
| Describes demand side | { | □ Consumption-leisure optimality condition | $\frac{u_c(c_t, 1-n_t)}{u_l(c_t, 1-n_t)} = w_t$ | |
| | | □ Consumption-savings optimality condition | $\frac{u_c(c_t, 1-n_t)}{\beta u_c(c_{t+1}, 1-n_{t+1})} = \frac{1+i_t}{1+\pi_{t+1}}$ | |
| Describes supply side | { | □ Labor-demand condition | $w_t < f'(n_t) = 1$ | Note wage is LESS THAN MP of labor |
| | | □ New Keynesian Phillips Curve | $\frac{1}{1-\varepsilon}[1-\varepsilon mc_t]n_t - \psi\pi_t(1+\pi_t) + \beta\psi\pi_{t+1}(1+\pi_{t+1}) = 0$ | |
| Describes market clearing | | □ Resource constraint | $c_t + \frac{\psi}{2}(\pi_t)^2 = n_t$ | |

"CASHLESS" NK FRAMEWORK

- Resource constraint – in every period t ,

$$c_t + \frac{\psi}{2}(\pi_t)^2 = n_t (= f(n_t))$$

- Total output used for private-sector consumption...
 - ...and menu costs
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- Summarize private-sector equilibrium conditions

- Describes demand side
 - Consumption-leisure optimality condition $\frac{u_2(c_t, 1-n_t)}{u_1(c_t, 1-n_t)} = w_t$
 - Consumption-savings optimality condition $\frac{u_1(c_t, 1-n_t)}{\beta u_1(c_{t+1}, 1-n_{t+1})} = \frac{1+i_t}{1+\pi_{t+1}}$
- Describes supply side
 - Labor-demand condition $mc_t < f'(n_t) = 1$ $mc_t = w_t$ in every period (Problem Set 6)
 - New Keynesian Phillips Curve $\frac{1}{1-\varepsilon}[1-\varepsilon mc_t]n_t - \psi\pi_t(1+\pi_t) + \beta\psi\pi_{t+1}(1+\pi_{t+1}) = 0$
- Describes market clearing
 - Resource constraint $c_t + \frac{\psi}{2}(\pi_t)^2 = n_t$

"CASHLESS" NK FRAMEWORK

- Condense private-sector equilibrium conditions....

- ...by imposing $w_t = mc_t$ and $n_t = c_t + \frac{\psi}{2}(\pi_t)^2$ everywhere

Consumption-leisure optimality condition

Consumption-savings optimality condition

$$\frac{u_2\left(c_t, 1 - c_t - \frac{\psi}{2}(\pi_t)^2\right)}{u_1\left(c_t, 1 - c_t - \frac{\psi}{2}(\pi_t)^2\right)} = mc_t$$

One final substitution to condense things....

$$\frac{u_1\left(c_t, 1 - c_t - \frac{\psi}{2}(\pi_t)^2\right)}{\beta u_1\left(c_{t+1}, 1 - c_{t+1} - \frac{\psi}{2}(\pi_{t+1})^2\right)} = \frac{1+i_t}{1+\pi_{t+1}}$$

- New Keynesian Phillips Curve

$$\frac{1}{1-\varepsilon}[1-\varepsilon mc_t]\left(1 - c_t - \frac{\psi}{2}\pi_t^2\right) - \psi\pi_t(1+\pi_t) + \beta\psi\pi_{t+1}(1+\pi_{t+1}) = 0$$

"CASHLESS" NK FRAMEWORK

□ Condense private-sector equilibrium conditions....

- ...by imposing $w_t = mc_t$ and $n_t = c_t + \frac{\psi}{2}(\pi_t)^2$ everywhere
- Consumption-savings optimality condition

$$\frac{u_1\left(c_t, 1 - c_t - \frac{\psi}{2}(\pi_t)^2\right)}{\beta u_1\left(c_{t+1}, 1 - c_{t+1} - \frac{\psi}{2}(\pi_{t+1})^2\right)} = \frac{1 + i_t}{1 + \pi_{t+1}}$$

□ New Keynesian Phillips Curve

$$\frac{1}{1 - \varepsilon} \left[1 - \frac{\varepsilon u_2\left(c_t, 1 - c_t - \frac{\psi}{2}(\pi_t)^2\right)}{u_1\left(c_t, 1 - c_t - \frac{\psi}{2}(\pi_t)^2\right)} \right] \left(1 - c_t - \frac{\psi}{2}\pi_t^2 \right) - \psi\pi_t(1 + \pi_t) + \beta\psi\pi_{t+1}(1 + \pi_{t+1}) = 0$$

"CASHLESS" NK FRAMEWORK

□ Condense private-sector equilibrium conditions....

- ...by imposing $w_t = mc_t$ and $n_t = c_t + \frac{\psi}{2}(\pi_t)^2$ everywhere
- Consumption-savings optimality condition

$$\frac{u_1\left(c, 1 - c - \frac{\psi}{2}\pi^2\right)}{\beta u_1\left(c, 1 - c - \frac{\psi}{2}\pi^2\right)} = \frac{1 + i}{1 + \pi}$$

□ New Keynesian Phillips Curve

$$\frac{1}{1 - \varepsilon} \left[1 - \frac{\varepsilon u_2\left(c, 1 - c - \frac{\psi}{2}\pi^2\right)}{u_1\left(c, 1 - c - \frac{\psi}{2}\pi^2\right)} \right] \left(1 - c - \frac{\psi}{2}\pi^2 \right) - \psi\pi(1 + \pi) + \beta\psi\pi(1 + \pi) = 0$$

□ Limit attention to steady-state (i.e., long run) policy questions

"CASHLESS" NK FRAMEWORK

- Condense private-sector equilibrium conditions....

- ...by imposing $w_t = mc_t$ and $n_t = c_t + \frac{\psi}{2}(\pi_t)^2$ everywhere

- Consumption-savings optimality condition

NK view:

Monetary policy does not operate through demand side...

$$\frac{u_1\left(c, 1 - c - \frac{\psi}{2}g^2\right)}{\beta u_1\left(c, 1 - c - \frac{\psi}{2}g^2\right)} = \frac{1+i}{1+g}$$

- New Keynesian Phillips Curve

Monetary policy operates through supply side

$$\frac{1}{1-\varepsilon} \left[1 - \frac{\varepsilon u_2\left(c, 1 - c - \frac{\psi}{2}g^2\right)}{u_1\left(c, 1 - c - \frac{\psi}{2}g^2\right)} \right] \left(1 - c - \frac{\psi}{2}g^2 \right) - \psi g(1+g) + \beta \psi g(1+g) = 0$$

- Limit attention to steady-state (i.e., long run) policy questions
 - And (finally!...) use long-run monetarist relationship $g = n$

"CASHLESS" NK FRAMEWORK

- Condense private-sector equilibrium conditions....

- ...by imposing $w_t = mc_t$ and $n_t = c_t + \frac{\psi}{2}(\pi_t)^2$ everywhere

- Consumption-savings optimality condition

NK view:

Monetary policy does not operate through demand side...

~~$$\frac{u_1\left(c, 1 - c - \frac{\psi}{2}g^2\right)}{\beta u_1\left(c, 1 - c - \frac{\psi}{2}g^2\right)} = \frac{1+i}{1+g}$$~~

SO IGNORE C-S CONDITION IN ANALYSIS OF OPTIMAL POLICY PROBLEM...

ONLY TAKE INTO ACCOUNT NKPC!

- New Keynesian Phillips Curve

Monetary policy operates through supply side

$$\frac{1}{1-\varepsilon} \left[1 - \frac{\varepsilon u_2\left(c, 1 - c - \frac{\psi}{2}g^2\right)}{u_1\left(c, 1 - c - \frac{\psi}{2}g^2\right)} \right] \left(1 - c - \frac{\psi}{2}g^2 \right) - \psi g(1+g) + \beta \psi g(1+g) = 0$$

- Limit attention to steady-state (i.e., long run) policy questions
 - And (finally!...) use long-run monetarist relationship $g = n$

OPTIMAL POLICY ANALYSIS

- Can express entire steady-state private-sector equilibrium as

$$\frac{1}{1-\varepsilon} \left[1 - \frac{\varepsilon u_2 \left(c, 1 - c - \frac{\psi}{2} g^2 \right)}{u_1 \left(c, 1 - c - \frac{\psi}{2} g^2 \right)} \right] \left(1 - c - \frac{\psi}{2} g^2 \right) - \psi g(1+g) + \beta \psi g(1+g) = 0$$

- Defines implicitly a **reaction function** $\bar{c}(g)$
 - A (potentially complicated..) summary description of how private-sector equilibrium quantities depend on any given choice of government policy g
- Maintained assumption
 - Central bank knows/understand perfectly the private-sector reaction function
 - Realism? Impossible for a central bank to literally know this...
 - ...but provides a starting point for analysis
- → Central bank takes into account the reaction function $\bar{c}(g)$ when setting (optimal) policy

OPTIMAL POLICY ANALYSIS

- Goal of policy makers
 - Maximize welfare (utility) of representative consumer
 - In steady-state

$$\sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \beta^s u \left(\bar{c}, 1 - \bar{c} - \frac{\psi}{2} g^2 \right) = \frac{u \left(\bar{c}, 1 - \bar{c} - \frac{\psi}{2} g^2 \right)}{1 - \beta}$$

Recall infinite summation formula



$$\sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \beta^s u \left(\bar{c}(g), 1 - \bar{c}(g) - \frac{\psi}{2} g^2 \right) = \frac{u \left(\bar{c}(g), 1 - \bar{c}(g) - \frac{\psi}{2} g^2 \right)}{1 - \beta}$$

Taking into account private-sector reaction function

- The formal policy problem
 - Choose g that maximizes private-sector welfare
 - The $\bar{c}(g)$ function summarizes the behavior of private markets

OPTIMAL POLICY ANALYSIS

- Optimal monetary policy problem

$$\sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \beta^s u\left(\bar{c}(g), 1 - \bar{c}(g) - \frac{\psi}{2} g^2\right) = \frac{u\left(\bar{c}(g), 1 - \bar{c}(g) - \frac{\psi}{2} g^2\right)}{1 - \beta}$$

- FOC with respect to g

- KEY: NOW need to take into account the dependence of private-market outcomes on the policy in place

OPTIMAL POLICY ANALYSIS

- Optimal monetary policy problem

$$\sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \beta^s u\left(\bar{c}(g), 1 - \bar{c}(g) - \frac{\psi}{2} g^2\right) = \frac{u\left(\bar{c}(g), 1 - \bar{c}(g) - \frac{\psi}{2} g^2\right)}{1 - \beta}$$

- FOC with respect to g

- KEY: NOW need to take into account the dependence of private-market outcomes on the policy in place

↓
Rearrange to MRS = ... form

- If policy is set optimally

$$\frac{u_2\left(c(g), 1 - c(g) - \frac{\psi}{2} g^2\right)}{u_1\left(c(g), 1 - c(g) - \frac{\psi}{2} g^2\right)} = \frac{c'(g)}{c'(g) + \psi g}$$

NOTE: If $\psi = 0$, exactly the same optimal-policy condition as in flexible-price analysis (Chapter 17) – i.e., RHS = 1

OPTIMAL POLICY ANALYSIS

- If policy is set optimally

$$\frac{u_2\left(c(g), 1-c(g)-\frac{\psi}{2}g^2\right)}{u_1\left(c(g), 1-c(g)-\frac{\psi}{2}g^2\right)} = \frac{c'(g)}{c'(g)+\psi g}$$

- Compare with private-sector equilibrium

$$\frac{1}{1-\varepsilon} \left[1 - \frac{\varepsilon u_2\left(c, 1-c-\frac{\psi}{2}g^2\right)}{u_1\left(c, 1-c-\frac{\psi}{2}g^2\right)} \right] \left(1-c-\frac{\psi}{2}g^2 \right) - \psi g(1+g) + \beta \psi g(1+g) = 0$$

- **QUESTION:** What money growth rate g achieves this outcome?...

OPTIMAL POLICY ANALYSIS

- If policy is set optimally

$$\frac{u_2\left(c(g), 1-c(g)-\frac{\psi}{2}g^2\right)}{u_1\left(c(g), 1-c(g)-\frac{\psi}{2}g^2\right)} = \frac{c'(g)}{c'(g)+\psi g}$$

- Compare with private-sector equilibrium

Introduce ε factor here... \rightarrow

$$\frac{1}{1-\varepsilon} \left[\varepsilon \frac{u_2\left(c, 1-c-\frac{\psi}{2}g^2\right)}{u_1\left(c, 1-c-\frac{\psi}{2}g^2\right)} \right] \left(1-c-\frac{\psi}{2}g^2 \right) - \psi g(1+g) + \beta \psi g(1+g) = 0$$

- **QUESTION:** What money growth rate g achieves this outcome?...

- Impossible to solve for $g!$...

- ...unless we slightly "modify" the condition (NKPC) describing private-sector equilibrium...

- Interpretation: a corrective *fiscal policy* intervention (Problem Set 6)

OPTIMAL POLICY ANALYSIS

- QUESTION: What money growth rate g aligns these two conditions?

$$\frac{u_2\left(c(g), 1-c(g) - \frac{\psi}{2}g^2\right)}{u_1\left(c(g), 1-c(g) - \frac{\psi}{2}g^2\right)} = \frac{c'(g)}{c'(g) + \psi g}$$

Summarizes outcome under optimal policy

$$\frac{1}{1-\varepsilon} \left[1 - \frac{u_2\left(c, 1-c - \frac{\psi}{2}g^2\right)}{u_1\left(c, 1-c - \frac{\psi}{2}g^2\right)} \right] \left(1-c - \frac{\psi}{2}g^2 \right) - \psi g(1+g) + \beta \psi g(1+g) = 0$$

Summarizes private-sector equilibrium for any arbitrary policy choice

- By inspection...

OPTIMAL POLICY ANALYSIS

- QUESTION: What money growth rate g aligns these two conditions?

$$\frac{u_2(c(g), 1-c(g))}{u_1(c(g), 1-c(g))} = 1$$

$$\frac{1}{1-\varepsilon} \left[1 - \frac{u_2(c, 1-c)}{u_1(c, 1-c)} \right] (1-c) = 0 \xrightarrow{\text{Solution requires}} \frac{u_2(c, 1-c)}{u_1(c, 1-c)} = 1$$

- By inspection... $g = 0$ aligns the private-sector outcome with the policymaker's desired outcome

ALIGNING THESE IS THE GOAL!

ZERO INFLATION POLICY

- ❑ **Optimal long-run money growth rate is $g = 0$**
- ❑ Money supply should **remain constant** in the long run!
- ❑ **Optimal long-run inflation**
 - ❑ Monetarist link

$$\pi = g = 0$$
 - ❑ **Zero long-run inflation!** A normative statement
 - ❑ Central bank **should** seek to target zero inflation on average
- ❑ **Optimal long-run nominal interest rate**
 - ❑ $i > 0$ from Fisher relation (aka consumption-savings optimality condition)
- ❑ **Quite different policy recommendation from Friedman Rule!**
 - ❑ Zero inflation, not negative inflation
 - ❑ \leftrightarrow Positive nominal interest rate, not zero nominal interest rate
- ❑ **Fundamental difference: sticky prices vs. flexible prices**

UNDERSTANDING ZERO INFLATION POLICY

- ❑ **What does $g = n = 0$ achieve?**
- ❑ Eliminates the **price adjustment costs** in the resource constraint

$$c + \frac{\psi}{2} \pi^2 = n \quad \xrightarrow{\text{Zero inflation}} \quad c = n$$
 - ❑ Adjustment costs are a **cost!**...
 - ❑ There is **no benefit** of "sluggish" or "sticky" prices!...
 - ❑ Basic economics: an activity has positive costs but no benefits \rightarrow optimally want none of that activity!
- ❑ Private-sector achieves efficiency along consumption-leisure margin

$$\frac{u_2(c, 1-c)}{u_1(c, 1-c)} = 1$$
 - ❑ Zero inflation allows policy makers to achieve economic efficiency in private markets – even though central bank is NOT a Social Planner
 - ❑ Notice very nuanced/precise statements/logic...
- ❑ **HOWEVER: zero inflation only "works" if fiscal policy is also being set optimally (Problem Set 6) – raises coordination issues, etc?...**

PRACTICAL RELEVANCE OF ZERO INFLATION

- ❑ A benchmark in the theory of monetary policy
- ❑ Has been a practical guide for the conduct of monetary policy in last 25 years
- ❑ Zero inflation technically only a long-run optimal policy recommendation
- ❑ But has become the intellectual guidepost for central banks worldwide even for business-cycle-frequency inflation goals
- ❑ Encapsulated in the mantra “low and stable inflation”
- ❑ No central banks target (explicitly or implicitly) EXACTLY ZERO inflation
 - ❑ Rather, **positive** long-run inflation targets
- ❑ What can rationalize positive long-run inflation targets?
 - ❑ WAGE (as opposed to price) rigidity
 - ❑ Financial frictions?
 - ❑ Hitting zero-lower-bound on nom i.r. during recessions the central issue
 - ❑ i.e., Blanchard suggestion
- ❑ Nature of and costs (and benefits?) associated with price adjustment still not well understood

Active areas of research